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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent substantially adopts the Statement of Issues 
presented for review as set forth by the appellant. 
There are sufficient facts to determine an absence of 
legal malpractice. Respondent notes that reference is made 
in appellant's Brief to depositions of the parties and 
respondent is assuming that the depositions, upon 
stipulation of counsel, were published by motion in open 
court on August 26, 1987, and if they were not, that it is 
stipulated that they are for purposes of this appeal. 
Respondent has similarly made reference to the depositions 
of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent adopts appellantfs Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. John C. Beaslin is a licensed attorney under the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
2. On or about March 1, 1976, Mr. Beaslin prepared a 
Contract under the terms of which nine hundred ninety (990) 
of the one thousand (1,000) shares of stock in Merkley 
Motors, Inc., owned by the plaintiff and his wife, Janet, 
were to be acquired by Tal R. Merkley, Charles Glen Merkley 
and his wife, Charlene Merkley. The remaining ten (10) 
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shares were already owned by Tal R. Merkley. (See Contract 
dated March 1, 1976.) [R. 23]. 
3. At the time of the execution of the Contract, the 
plaintiff was the President of Merkley Motors and continued 
in that office. There is no written documentation that the 
plaintiff ever resigned as an officer or director. On 
February 23, 1978, an Agreement between Merkley Motors, 
Inc., as seller, and Tal and Wyoma Merkley and Charles and 
Charlene Merkley, as buyers, was executed. The plaintiff 
signed as President of Merkley Motors, Inc. (See Agreement 
dated February 23, 1978.) [R. 38, 39]. 
4. On April 19, 1976, a Letter of Instructions was 
executed by the parties with Walker Bank under the terms of 
which the nine hundred ninety (990) shares were held in 
escrow until all payments had been made to Ray and Janet 
Merkley. In the event of default in payments by the buyers, 
the escrow agent, upon demand of seller Ray Merkley, the 
nine hundred ninety (990) shares were to be returned. (See 
Letter of Instructions.) [R. 34, 35]. 
5. The purchase price for the stock was ONE HUNDRED 
TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($120,000.00). FIFTY THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($50,000.00) was paid down. The FIFTY THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($50,000.00) was received from proceeds of a loan 
from Walker Bank dated March 15, 1976. The plaintiff was 
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fully aware that the real property in question was owned by 
the corporation and was being mortgaged to help pay Ray and 
Janet Merkley part of the sales price. Mr. Beaslin was 
never asked to attend or participate in tfce loan arrangement 
I 
or closing. (See J. Ray Merkley Deposition, pp. 14-15.) 
6. From the proceeds of the Walker Bank loan, a 
Farmers Home Administration loan owed by the plaintiff was 
fully satisfied. (See J. Ray Merkley Deposition, p. 17.) 
7. Merkley Motors, Inc., was the fee title owner of 
the real property mortgaged to Walker Bank. (See J. Ray 
Merkley Deposition, p. 17.) 
8. Mr. Beaslin prepared and recorded a UCC-1 filing on 
May 4, 1976, with the Lieutenant Governor's Office, securing 
the plaintiff and his wife. The security described included 
inventory and personal assets of Merkley Motors, Inc., which 
were free and clear of claims of other creditors. 
9. Shortly after the Contract was signed on March 1, 
1976, the plaintiff moved from Vernal to Salt Lake City. 
(See J. Ray Merkley Deposition, p. 4.) 
10. From the spring of 1976 until November 23, 1983, 
the plaintiff did not in any way communicate with Mr. 
Beaslin relative to this matter. Merkley Motors filed a 
Bankruptcy Petition on December 6, 1983. (See J. Ray 
Merkley Deposition, p. 34.) 
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11. The plaintiff filed a timely Proof of Claim. It 
is not known what, if any, distribution plaintiff has 
received. 
12. On February 23, 1984, a bankruptcy auction took 
place at 1620 North Vernal Avenue, Vernal, Utah, pursuant to 
legal notice. [R. 117]. 
13. The sale of all property not secured by creditors 
occurred on February 23, L984, and the auction accounting 
indicated the bankruptcy sale realized a net amount of 
SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-NINE AND 23/100 
($7,669.23). (See Report of Harry Margulies, February 24, 
1984.) [R. 118]. 
14. The plaintiff received notice of the bankruptcy 
sale, appeared at the sale, and bid about FOUR THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($4,000.00) for the bulk of the items. The portion 
he bid for sold for approximately FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($4,200.00). (See J. Ray Merkley Deposition, 
p. 45.) 
15. The instant case was filed with the District Court 
in Uintah County on July 30, 3 984. [R. 1]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Where there is no continuing attorney-client 
relationship and no active concealment of fact or deceit, a 
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cause of action based on malpractice accrues at the time of 
the act or occurrence. 
There was no breach of duty. The defendant handled the 
plaintiff's business affairs competently and completely 
within the scope of his employment. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The applicable Statute of Limitations is Utah Code 
Annotated §78-12-25(1): 
ffan action upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; 
also on an open account for goods, wares and 
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store 
account; also on an open account for work, labor or 
services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, 
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is received. 
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided 
for by law.ff 
Where an attorney is retained to draft documents or 
close a business transaction such as in the instant case, 
the courts have consistently ruled that malpractice actions 
are based on a breach of contract and that the time begins 
to run from the date of the occurrence or performance of the 
work. In the case of Lazzaro v. Kelly, 57 NY.2d 630, 454 
NYS.2d 59, 439 NE.2d 868 (1982), the court concluded that 
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the Statute of Limitations for alleged preparation of a 
contract for the sale of a business accrued upon the 
completion of the act. This has always been the New York 
rule. 
The great weight of authority in the American 
Jurisdictions for negligent acts or omissions take the view 
that the Statute of Limitations begins to run from the time 
of the occurrence of the negligent act or omission. See 
Annot., Legal Malpractice-Statute of Limitations, 32 A.L.R. 
4th 260 et seq. 
The case of Buxton v. Perry, 32 Wash. App. 211, 646 
P.2d 779 (1982) is instructive. The Washington Supreme 
Court has begun a modified discovery rule in some cases. 
But in a legal malpractice case involving the drafting of a 
real estate contract, the court determined that the three 
year Statute of Limitations began to run from the time the 
contract was prepared and delivered into the hands of the 
plaintiff. The court stressed the idea that the facts were 
within the four corners of the documents and were thus 
equally within the knowledge of the plaintiff and the 
defendant. 
In the instant case, the document which was the vehicle 
transferring the business was straightforward, short, simple 
and easily understood. The defendant took steps to perfect 
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a security interest in the inventory which was all done at 
the time of the transaction. The facts, as will be 
developed later, demonstrate that no further act could have 
been done at that time and the parties lived happily under 
the contract through the expiration of the four year Statute 
of Limitations. 
In Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 
(1978), the Idaho Supreme Court refused to judicially 
legislate into a discovery or damage rule in considering an 
attorney malpractice case for an alleged negligent probate 
of a will. The Idaho Supreme Court stuck to the occurrence 
I 
rule where their state legislature had expressly made 
inroads and changes in the medical malpractice fields. 
The Utah Supreme Court has aligned itself with this 
general proposition in the case of Hansen v. Petrof, 527 
P.2d 116 (Utah 1974). 
It should be noted that some jurisdictions that have 
gone to the discovery or damage rule have been faced with 
facts concerning active negligence on a continuing basis or 
active deceit or concealment continuing through the 
relationship of the attorney-client. It is noteworthy that 
Justice Ellett in a concurring opinion in Hansen v. Petrof, 
writes: 
"...The cause of action, if any there be, should 
ripen and the statute of limitations begin to run only 
- 7 -
upon termination of services of the attorney in that 
particular case." 
Giving the plaintiff the benefit of Justice Ellett's 
extended protection, the Statute of Limitations had run long 
prior to the filing of this action on or about July 30, 
1984. 
If the plaintiff contends that the statute does not 
commence to run until after the termination of services of 
the attorney in the particular case, the four year statute 
would have commenced to run on May 4, 1976, because that was 
the last date the defendant performed any services in behalf 
of the plaintiff in connection with the instant matter. It 
is undisputed that the plaintiff left Vernal for Salt Lake 
shortly after the Contract was signed in March of 1976 and 
never again had any conversation with the defendant 
concerning this matter until 1983 when the buyers either had 
or were contemplating filing bankruptcy, a period in excess 
of seven years. 
If the plaintiff contends the Contract was not properly 
drafted on March 1, 1976, the statute had run by February 
28, 1980. 
If the plaintiff contends that the defendant should 
have advised the plaintiff that the UCC-1 filing recorded 
May 4, 1976, must be renewed before the expiration of five 
years, the statute would have run by May 3, 1980. 
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In summary, the great weight of American Jurisprudence 
still follows the rule that the Statute of Limitations for 
legal malpractice involving breach of contract, begins to 
run from the time of the occurrence. See Annot., Legal 
Malpractice-Statute of Limitations, 32 A.L.R. 4th 260 at 
268. It is noteworthy in reviewing jurisdictions that have 
eroded this rule, they have been faced with entirely 
different fact situations and, it is further, noteworthy 
that the Statutes of Limitations have been either one or two 
year limitations, see for example, California and Texas 32 
A.L.R. 4th 260 at 279. 
In the instant case, from the depositions, the 
understandings of the parties and from the documents 
themselves, which were fairly short and straightforward, it 
would be absurd to have a possible claim extend on a tail of 
in excess of seven years, particularly where the plaintiff 
was involved in subsequent dealings in his capacity as a 
corporate officer, vis-a-vis the escrow provisions for the 
sale of capital stock at later dates. 
Point II. 
DEFENDANT DID NOT BREACH 
ANY CONTRACTUAL DUTY 
The plaintiff's allegations of malpractice sound in 
contract. Therefore, the issue is what duty is owed by an 
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attorney to his client, and if that duty is breached, what 
damages has the client suffered. 
The law is well settled in Utah. An attorney is 
required to possess the legal knowledge and skills common to 
members of his profession in his community and to represent 
his client's interests with competence and diligence. 
Jackson v. Drabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); Dunn v. 
McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 
1978). 
Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law §199, states: 
An attorney's "duty to his client requires an 
attorney to exercise the knowledge, skill, and ability 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the 
legal profession similarly situated." 
However, it is clear that there is no requirement that 
an attorney be infallible. Making a mistake is not 
negligence as a matter of law. Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092 
(Colo. App. 1985). 
The plaintiff contends that the defendant breached his 
implied contract to prepare a Sales Agreement in such a 
manner as to protect and secure plaintiff's interest as a 
seller. The basis of the allegations are: 
1. The sale would be secured by real property upon 
which Merkley Motors was located in Vernal, Utah. 
2. The buyers would always maintain a secured 
inventory in excess of the balance owing. 
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3. The control of the corporation was transferred to 
the buyers without affording the plaintiff any protection. 
4. The defendant improperly prepared a UCC-1 form and 
failed to advise the plaintiff that he must renew the UCC-1 
filing before the end of five years. 
In responding to said allegations, the defendant 
asserts that the Contract and UCC-1 filing were prepared in 
strict accordance with the terms and conditions as 
previously agreed between the parties. 
The defendant shall address the plaintifffs contentions 
in order. 
1. The real property was, in fact, deeded by Ray 
Merkley and his wife, Janet, to Merkley Motors, Inc., on 
March 4, 1975. At the time of the execution of the deed, 
there was a mortgage against the property in favor of the 
Farmers Home Administration dated January 4, 1965, and 
guaranteed by the plaintiff. 
Prior to the preparation and execution of the Contract 
on or about March 1, 1976, the plaintiff had met with the 
buyers and had agreed that the real property would be 
mortgaged to Walker Bank and Trust Company by Merkley 
Motors, the plaintiff, his wife and the buyers. 
Ray Merkley testified in his deposition: 
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(Ray Merkley Deposition, Page 13, Line 25; Page 14, Lines 
1-25) 
Q: "Now, getting the down payment, do you recall how 
you were able to get the fifty thousand dollars 
cash? That was paid to you, I assume. It says 












"It was paid to me." 
"How did you get that money?" 
"They g[a]ve it to me." 
"Do you know the source of the money, where the 
money came from?" 
"Yes. It came from Walker Bank at that time, it's 
First Interstate now." 
"About the time of the negotiation for the sale, 
were you also at that time negotiating — and when 
I say you, Tal and whoever might have been buying 
it -- negotiating with Walker Bank for a loan to 
pay the down payment?" 
"Yes." 
"Did you ever go over to Walker Bank and talk with 
any particular person relative to that financing?" 
"Yes." 
"Who would you talk with?" 
"Howard Carroll." 
"What position did he have?" 
"I think he was president of that branch. He was 
one of the officers anyway." 
"Do you recall in terms of the 1st of March when 
this contract was signed when you first talked with 
Howard Carroll?" 
(Ray Merkley Deposition, Page 15, Lines 1-3 and Lines 15-24) 
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A: "No, I donft recall." 
Q: "Would it have been before the 1st of March?" 
A: "Yes. Well, yeah, I think so. When was this 
signed?" 
Q: "At the time that you went over to the bank did Mr. 
Beaslin on any occasion ever go over to the bank 
with you?" 
A: "Not to my knowledge." 
Q: "Do you know whether or not you or anyone else had 
ever advised John Beaslin of the Walker Bank loan 
or where the fifty thousand would come from to pay 
you?" 
A: "Yes. I'm sure I did." 
Q: "Tell me what you did." 
A: "I'm sure I asked him how we would go about it 
because they wanted a mortgage on the property." 
Therefore, Merkley Motors, with the consent and 
knowledge of the plaintiff, executed a mortgage in favor of 
Walker Bank & Trust Company on March 15, 1976. The 
plaintiff, himself, received the direct benefit of FIFTY 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000.00). 
On page 1 of the Contract under paragraph entitled 
Effective Date, it states, "Possession of all of the 
property, both real and personal, owned by the said 
corporation shall be March 1, 1976." 
On page 3 of the Contract, the parties are specifically 
advised that title will be conveyed by the corporation to 
the buyers when all payments have been made. 
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The plaintiff, as a business man, independently 
conveyed the real property to the corporation and then 
knowingly, without any direction from the defendant, 
mortgaged said property for his own benefit. There is no 
basis for his contention that it was ever intended that the 
land be in his individual name or that he have a claim 
superior to the lending institution's claim. 
2. As part of the Contract, the buyers were to 
maintain an inventory in excess of the balance owing. 
Paragraph entitled INVENTORY on page 3 states: 
"The Buyers hereby agree that they shall at all 
times retain an inventory that is unmortgaged in excess 
of the balance that is owed to the Seller at all times 
during the terms of this contract.ff 
Plaintiff apparently now believes it was the 
responsibility of the defendant as the attorney to "insure" 
that the buyers would comply with all of the terms of the 
Contract. At the time the Contract was signed on March 1, 
1976, the plaintiff was satisfied that the inventory was 
adequate. There was no duty placed upon the defendant to 
monitor the size of the inventory. The plaintiff never 
asked the defendant to perform this duty. 
The duty to monitor the inventory was that of the 
plaintiff. In his deposition, the plaintiff testifies that 
he accepted that responsibility. 
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(J. Ray Merkley Deposition, Page 23, Line 25, Page 24, Lines 
1-24) 
Q: "Now, did you ever set up any kind of program or 
effort to monitor or make sure that they were 
maintaining that kind of inventory?" 
A: "Yes." 
Q: "Tell me what you did to kind of assure yourself 
that inventory was there in accordance with the 
contract." 
A: "Mostly I visited the store, personally went 
through the parts department and just visually 
looked to see what was there." 
Q: "How often would you do that?" 
A: "Whenever I happened to be in the Vernal area." 
Q: "And how often would you say that would be?" 
A: "Probably three times a year." 
Q: "And what years did you actually go out there and 
check it two or three times or something?" 
A: "I was in Vernal every year. That's where my 
parents live and I visit Vernal quite often." 
Q: "And on any of the occasions when you went out 
there and you say visually looked at the inventory, 
were you satisfied that they had adequate inventory 
there?" 
A: "All the time except for -- well, I was always 
satisfied that the inventory was there, but there 
was two times that I requested -- in fact, I 
requested it more than two times but two times I 
received because I requested it, written inventory 
and balance sheet[s] from them." 
On May 4, 1976, the defendant filed a UCC-1 form which 
encumbered the inventory and other personal assets of the 
corporation not otherwise securing other creditors. 
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The defendant did everything legally required of him, 
and the attorney-client relationship terminated at that 
time. 
3. The defendant provided the means by which the 
plaintiff could control the corporation during the time 
monies were still owing to him. 
The Contract has an Escrow Provision which declares 
that the nine hundred ninety (990) shares in Merkley Motors 
shall remain in escrow until all of the payments have been 
made. 
In the event of any default, the plaintiff was entitled 
to the return of the stock. There was no requirement that 
the plaintiff resign any office in the corporation. Under 
paragraph V of the Letter of Instructions, the seller may 
demand the return of the stock and all other documents in 
the event any installment is 60 days late. 
In carrying out the terms of the Contract, all of the 
parties acknowledged the power and authority of the 
plaintiff to exercise control as described in the following 
sub-paragraphs (a) through (j): 
(a) Plaintiff approved the mortgage in favor of 
Walker Bank. 
(b) Plaintiff monitored the inventory. 
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(c) There is no record th^t plaintiff ever 
resigned as an officer and/or director. 
(d) The plaintiff acknowledged that he still 
owned and controlled the stock. 
(J. Ray Merkley Deposition, Page 30, Lines 5-19) 
Q: fTDo you recall whether or not the stock 
certificates, the thousand shares, actually were 
placed with Walker Bank to be held in escrow?" 
Mr. Bennett: "Nine ninety.11 
The Witness: "Nine hundred and ninety. Tal had ten 
shares." 
By Mr. Nygaard: 
Q: "The nine hundred and ninety represented yours and 
Janet's shares; is that correct?" 
A: "Yes. They were placed there." 
Q: "Do you know how long they were to be held by 
Walker Bank?" 
A: "Until this mortgage -- this note was paid off." 
Q: "Until you were paid in full?" 
A: "Yes." 
(e) The Letter of Instructions with Walker Bank 
was signed by the plaintiff as President. 
(f) When shares were sold, plaintiff executed the 
release and did sign the stock certificates. 
(J. Merkley Deposition, Page 30, Lines 20-25; Page 31, Lines 
1-2): 
Q: "Were the shares in your name during this period of 
time?" 
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A: "They were in my name and Janet's name until there 
was some shares released.,f 
Q: ftWhat shares are you referring to there?" 
A: "When Francis Palmer bought in, why they paid me a 
sum of money to release a certain amount of the 
shares and they was released and given to Francis 
Palmer." 
(g) The plaintiff received the TEN THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($10,000.00) from the sale of the stock. 
(J. Ray Merkley Deposition, Page 31, Lines 17-20) 
Q: "Did you get that ten thousand dollar figure?" 
A: "Yes." 
Q: "Did it go to you and Janet or just to you?" 
A: "It went to me." 
(h) The plaintiff clearly understood any release 
of stock required his signature. 
(J. Ray Merkley Deposition, Page 32, Lines 12-25; Page 33, 
Lines 1-12) 
Q: "The stock, however, apparently with Walker Bank 
was still in your name to the best of your 
understanding; is that correct?" 
A: "The stock was." 
Q: "And it did require you to release the stock to any 
other person; is that right." 
A: "That was my understanding, yes." 
Q: "Now, look at defendant's Exhibit 10 and I will ask 
you if you recognize that signature." 
A: "That signature is mine." 
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Q: "Was that document signed about the same time as 
the Exhibit 9 and relates to the same ten thousand 
dollar stock exchange figure?11 
A: "I think that this here is evidently instructing 
Walker Bank to in the changes in this -- the shares 
that's in escrow because of the change made here.11 
Q: "That's the question I want to ask you is the best 
that you recall at the time you received the ten 
thousand dollars you did authorize the bank to 
deliver a part of those nine hundred and ninety 
shares to one who purchased the stock; is that 
correct?" 
A: "Yes. I authorized them to deliver three hundred 
and thirty-four shares." 
Q: "Later on were you aware also that other shares 
were sold by Tal to Glen?" 
A: "Yes." 
(i) The plaintiff was advised as to the business 
activities of Merkley Motors by the buyers. 
Ray Merkley Deposition, Page 33, Lines 22-25; Page 34, 
1-17) 
Q: "How did you become aware that Tal had sold out to 
Glen?" 
A: "Tal told me that he was going to get out." 
Q: "During this time when Palmer was buying in and Tal 
was selling out were you generally advised of all 
of these transactions that were taking place?" 
A: "Yes." 
Q: "Generally who was advising you as to what some 
changes were occurring in the operation of the 
business and the ownership of the business." 
A: "It would have been either Tal or Glen." 
Q: "In your judgment were Tal and Glen generally 
keeping you informed as to what was going on?" 
- 19 -
A: "I thought they was, yes." 
Q: "Subsequently did you ever determine that they 
weren't advising you of what was going on?" 
A: "Just until right there at the last when they took 
out -- just before they -- prior to taking out 
bankruptcy." 
Q: "That was Glen that took out bankruptcy, wasn't 
it?" 
A: "Yes." 
(j) The plaintiff was involved in the business 
right up to the time of the bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff admits that he had no 
conversations with John Beaslin between March 1976 and the 
filing of the bankruptcy. 
(J. Ray Merkley Deposition, Page 34, Lines 18-23) 
Q: "During the time after March of 1976 and after you 
had left Vernal, on what occasions, if any, did you 
have any meetings or telephone calls or any kind of 
communication with John Beaslin?" 
A: "I don't remember specifically any time other than 
just the latest just when this bankruptcy took 
place." 
Obviously, the plaintiff did not believe that the 
defendant had any duty or responsibility to assist him with 
respect to his ongoing business dealings with the buyers. 
4. The defendant properly and timely prepared a UCC-1 
filing on all inventory and personalty not being used to 
secure obligations of other creditors. All of the parties 
acknowledged the seller as Merkley Motors with the plaintiff 
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as having the power and authority to monitor the business, 
release shares of Merkley Motors when payments were made, 
and to participate in business meetings and transactions. 
The buyers made reports whether formally or informally 
to the plaintiff. 
The UCC-1 filing listed Merkley Motors, Inc., as the 
debtor and the plaintiff as the creditor because all of the 
assets, real and personal, were in the name of Merkley 
Motors. The buyers had no assets to give as security. The 
UCC-1 filing was made in accordance with the Contract of 
March 1, 1976, and as intended by the parties. 
Plaintiff admits that he had no communication with the 
defendant from March 1, 1976, until the time of bankruptcy 
in 1983--a period of almost seven years and six months. 
When this long delay is considered in light of the 
plaintiff having moved from Vernal to Salt Lake, it is 
evident that the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant in this matter terminated during the spring of 
1976. 
The defendant in his deposition confirms the testimony 
of the plaintiff: 
(John C. Beaslin Deposition Page 20, Lines 2-16) 
Q: "And what was your impression oi what it was that 
Mr. Merkley wanted you to do?" 
A: "Prepare the contract and set up the Stock 
Certificates so that he could have hold of those as 
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security instruments over at the bank; and in the 
contract provide, which we did, that they would 
maintain an inventory over there in excess of the 
amount of the unpaid balance that was owed to Ray." 
"I recall specifically telling Ray at that time 
that it would certainly be up to him to check on 
that inventory because they could have depleted his 
inventory without him knowing about it and so 
forth; and that he would have to make frequent 
checks or whatever to try and determine and keep a 
hold of that to determine whether or not they were 
complying with that provision. 
(John C. Beaslin Deposition, Page 48, Lines 1-11) 
Q: "When did you last see Ray after the execution of 
this document on March 1, 1976?" 
A: "Well, Ray moved to Salt Lake. I don't recall 
exactly when he moved. I probably didn't see Ray 
until — I don't know -- maybe until '82 when he 
came out and I did that little deal for him on the 
divorce." 
Q: "So is it accurate to indicate that from the spring 
of 1976 until some time in 1983 you had no 
conversation with Ray concerning any matters?" 
A: "After he moved to Salt Lake, I don't recall seeing 
him out to Vernal that I can recall." 
The employment agreement of the attorney was completed 
at this time and the defendant did everything that was 
expected of him and required of him in a professional and 
competent manner. Not withstanding all of the above, the 
Statute of Limitations ran on March 2, 1980. 
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Point III. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
The plaintiff, by his conduct, caused the losses which 
he now claims to have suffered. 
1. The plaintiff, after conveying the real property to 
Merkley Motors, Inc., then mortgaged the property twice for 
his direct benefit; first, to Farmers Home Administration 
and second, to Walker Bank & Trust Co. Therefore, plaintiff 
was not entitled to a priority position. 
2. The plaintiff had the right and power to monitor 
the size of the inventory and failed to do so. 
3. The plaintiff had control of Merkley Motors, Inc., 
through his stock held in escrow, but he failed to exercise 
his prerogative to demand return of stock and assume 
complete control of the corporation. 
4. The plaintiff was invited to bid on the inventory 
at the bankruptcy auction, but refused to bid the necessary 
FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($4,200.00) to obtain the 
assets which he contends had a much higher value. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled that damages cannot 
be based upon speculations or conjecture. 
"A finding of such damages cannot properly be 
based on speculation or conjecture. They can be 
awarded only if there is a basis in the evidence upon 
which reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could 
believe with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff 
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suffered injury and damage and also that it was 
proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant.11 
(Dunn v. McKay, et al, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978). 
Assuming that the plaintiff can overcome the Statute of 
Limitations as a bar to recovery and the plaintiff's own 
contributory negligence, the defendant's liability would be 
limited to actual damages that proximately arose out of 
defendant's negligence. These losses could not exceed the 
FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($4,200.00) which 
represented the amount of the successful bid on the 
applicable inventory. 
CONCLUSION 
The Statute of Limitations in the present case begins 
to accrue at the date of the occurrence complained of and 
has clearly run, therefore, the four year Statute of 
Limitations bars this action. 
The respondent respectfully submits that he represented 
the appellant in a professional and diligent manner and 
given the provisions in the Contract, there was no 
breach of duty as a matter of law. 
Respondent respectfully asks this Court to affirm the 
ruling of the Court below dismissing the case with prejudice 
as being outside of the applicable Statute of Limitations. 
Respectfully submitted this (f^O^ day of February, 
1988. 
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